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Abstract
Trusted Execution Environment, or enclave, promises to
protect data confidentiality and execution integrity of an
outsourced computation on an untrusted host. Extending
the protection to distributed applications that run on phys-
ically separated hosts, however, remains non-trivial. For in-
stance, the current enclave provisioning model hinders elas-
ticity of cloud applications. Furthermore, it remains unclear
how an enclave process could verify if there exists another
concurrently running enclave process instantiated using the
same codebase, or count a number of such processes. In this
paper, we seek an autonomous membership service for en-
clave applications. The application owner only needs to par-
take in instantiating the very first process of the application,
whereas all subsequent process commission and decommis-
sion will be administered by existing and active processes
of that very application. To achieve both safety and live-
ness, our protocol design admits unjust excommunication of
a non-faulty process from the membership group. We im-
plement the proposed membership service in a system called
AMES. Our experimental study shows that AMES incurs
an overhead of 5% − 16% compared to vanilla enclave exe-
cution.
1. INTRODUCTION
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [21] protects data
confidentiality and execution integrity of outsourced com-
putations by offering a hardware-protected trusted execu-
tion environment (TEE), or enclave, that guards the user’s
security-critical application code and its data against un-
trusted system software including the operating system
(OS). The CPU prevents any non-enclave code from reading
or modifying enclave memory at runtime. SGX architecture
relies on the OS to instantiate enclave. A user can verify if
a specific enclave is correctly instantiated and running at a
remote host via a remote attestation protocol [9], which also
establishes a secure channel via which the user can provision
application secrets, if any, to the enclave.
While SGX allows users to harden security of software
applications on an untrusted host (or server) [10, 14], ex-
tending its protection to distributed applications running
on a number of hosts is non-trivial. More specifically, if the
application involves a secret that must not be revealed to
the untrusted host, the secret provisioning requires remote
attestation by the application owner. In the context of cloud
service, this hinders the elasticity of cloud applications, for
the cloud service providers cannot commission additional en-
clave processes dynamically at its sole discretion. In another
example, it is unclear how an enclave process could verify if
there exists another concurrently running enclave process in-
stantiated using the same codebase [1], or count the number
of such processes, in an autonomic manner. This capability
is desired in implementing singleton applications (i.e., only
a single instance of the application can be created and run)
and decentralized floating licensing (i.e., floating licensing
without the central license server).
Let us use an example of a forking attack [12] on appli-
cation that maintains persistent state to illustrate the chal-
lenges of extending TEE protections to a distributed envi-
ronment. At a high level, the adversary (e.g., cloud service
provider) instantiates multiple enclave processes of the same
application and feeds them with different, potentially con-
flicting, inputs so as to violate the expected behaviours of
the victim application. More specifically, consider an appli-
cation Prog that serves read and write requests of a stateless
client. The adversary runs two independent enclave pro-
cesses (or processes for short) of Prog, denoted by p1 and
p2, while keeping them oblivious to each other’s existence.
Since the adversary handles all I/O operations to the pro-
cesses, the client is only presented with a simple API for read
and write requests, and is unaware of the underlying provi-
sioning of the processes. At the beginning, both processes
assume an initial state s0. The client issues two sequential
requests, the first writes data dat to Prog’s memory, chang-
ing its state to s1, and the second reads from Prog its latest
written data. From the application logic, the client should
receive dat as a response to the second request. Neverthe-
less, if the adversary routes the write request to p1 and read
request to p2, the client will receive an obsolete (but authen-
ticated) response drawn from the stale state s0. This attack
may wreak severe havoc in financial applications wherein an
account balance should reflect at all time a correct transac-
tion history.
The example described earlier motivates the need of a
membership service for enclave applications in a distributed
environment. The membership service of an application
Prog not only facilitates seamless commissioning of Prog’s
enclave processes, but also monitors and keeps track of the
status of all Prog’s active processes, ensuring that their col-
lective existence adheres to the Service Level Agreement
(SLA). In a straight forward approach, one can implement
the membership service by maintaining a special directory
server that keeps track of all active processes, and excom-
municates a process that it suspects of being faulty from
the membership group. The commissioning of a new pro-
cess is augmented such that the newly instantiated process
remains nonoperational until its request to join the exist-
ing membership group is approved by the directory server.
Nonetheless, this approach is not desirable, for the direc-
tory server becomes an obvious single-point-of-failure. A
logical attempt to avoid the single-point-of-failure would be
to replicate the directory server into a distributed fault-
tolerant directory service comprising of a cluster of replicas
coordinating their operations via a consensus protocol such
as Paxos [19]. However, it is challenging to protect these
replicas themselves against forking attack [12], wherein the
adversary manage to splits the directory service replicas into
two or more “cliques”, each of which is oblivious to the oth-
ers’ existence. Such adversary can then selectively route
communications of the existing processes, or join request of
the newly instantiated processes to different clique of direc-
tory service replicas, thereby evading the control mechanism
that enforces the SLA.
In this paper, we seek a membership service that is au-
tonomous. In particular, once an application Prog has been
successfully bootstrapped, all subsequent process commis-
sion and decommission of Prog are administered by its own
active processes. This self-administering is attained by des-
ignating one of Prog’s active processes at a leader, while the
other assume the role of follower. The leader is tasked to
monitor the status of all follower processes by exchanging
heartbeat messages. On the one hand, the process commis-
sion requires acknowledgement from the leader and a quo-
rum of existing followers before the new process becomes
fully functional. On the other hand, any process that is sus-
pected of having halted is excommunicated from the mem-
bership group. Our protocol design necessarily admits un-
just suspicion and excommunication of a non-faulty process,
in order to sidestep the difficulty of solving the membership
problem in an asynchronous environment when faults may
be present [8]. To prevent the non-faulty yet excommuni-
cated process from disrupting the membership service, its fu-
ture communication to other processes of Prog is discarded,
rendering it isolated. The isolated process eventually halts
by committing suicide, fulfilling the excommunication.
We consider a powerful adversary that controls the OS (or
a hypervisor) of the hosts on which the enclave processes are
instantiated. The adversary can schedule or corrupt all non-
enclave processes, and restart the processes at will. Further,
it can control all network communications between the pro-
cesses regardless of whether they are instantiated on the
same or across different hosts. The adversary can modify,
reorder or delay the network messages arbitrarily. Nonethe-
less, we assume that the adversary cannot break enclave
protections, and is limited by the constraints of the crypto-
graphic methods employed.
We implement the proposed solution that enables au-
tonomous membership service for SGX enclaves in a system
called AMES. The application owner only needs to partake
in the commissioning of the first enclave process (i.e., con-
ducting remote attestation and provision application secret
to the enclave). All subsequent process commissioning (or
dismantling) during the lifetime of the application will be
handled automatically and securely. To facilitate the incor-
poration of AMES logic to an enclave application Prog, we
provide application developers with a AMES library that
envelops the membership service’s operations in a control
thread, separating them from the original operational logic
of Prog that is to be implemented in a worker thread (or
threads).
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper.
• We propose a new approach to enable autonomous
membership service for enclave-based applications,
which allows seamless commissioning and dismantling
of processes over the lifetime of the application.
• We provide a AMES library that encapsulates the
membership service’s operations, which can be easily
incorporated to any enclave-based application.
• We conduct empirical evaluation of the overhead in-
curred by AMES on both our local cluster with 35
servers and the Google Cloud Platform (GPC) nodes
spanning across 4 regions. The experimental results
show that AMES incurs an overhead of 5%−16% over
vanilla enclave execution.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
provides backgrounds on key properties of Intel SGX and
distributed consensus protocols. Section 3 presents our
problem statement, covering system and adversarial models,
design goals, and challenges. We propose our autonomous
membership service and its rationale in Section 4, before dis-
cussing the implementation details in Section 5. Section 6
reports our empirical evaluation, while Section 7 reviews the
related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes our work.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first describe key characteristics of Intel
SGX [21]. We then provide a brief overview of consensus
protocols.
2.1 Intel SGX
Enclave Execution. Intel SGX [21] is a set of CPU exten-
sions that are available on Intel CPUs starting from the Sky-
lake microarchitecture [3], capable of providing hardware-
protected TEE (or enclave) for generic computations. It
enables a host to instantiate one or multiple enclaves simul-
taneously. An enclave is associated with a CPU-guarded
address space which is accessible only by the enclave code;
the CPU blocks any non-enclave code’s attempt to access
the enclave memory. This effectively isolates the enclave
from other enclaves concurrently running on the same host,
from the OS, and from other user processes. Memory pages
can be swapped out of the enclave memory, but they are
encrypted using the processor’s key prior to leaving the en-
clave.
Enclaves cannot directly execute OS-provided services
such as I/O. In order to access those services, enclaves have
to employ OCalls (calls executed by the enclave code to
transfer the control to non-enclave code) and ECalls (API
for untrusted applications to transfer control back to the
enclave). These ECalls and OCalls constitute the enclave
boundary interface, enabling a communication between the
enclave code and the untrusted application to service OS-
provided functions. Clearly, enclave developer should design
such interface with caution, for ECalls exposed to the un-
trusted application may open up an attack surface to the
protected execution environment.
Attestation. Intel SGX allows a validator to verify if a spe-
cific enclave has been properly instantiated with the correct
code [9] via its attestation mechanisms. These mechanisms
also enable the validator and the attesting enclave to estab-
lish a secure, authenticated channel via which sensitive data
can be communicated.
If the attestation is carried out between two enclaves in-
stantiated on the same platform (or host), the mechanism in
use is referred to as local attestation. Once the attesting en-
clave has been initiated, the CPU computes its measurement
(i.e., the hash of its initial state). Next, the CPU produces
a message authentication code (MAC) of such measurement
using a key that is accessible only by the validating enclave.
The measurement and the MAC are then sent to the validat-
ing enclave for verification. Alternatively, if the validator is
a remote party, the CPU issues a remote attestation by sign-
ing the measurement with its private key under the Enhance
Privacy ID (EPID) scheme [18] [9]. The remote party ob-
taining the attestation then relies on the Intel’s Attestation
Service (IAS) to verify the signature contained in the attes-
tation [4], and then check the measurement value against a
known value.
Data sealing. Enclaves can persist their private state to
non-volatile memory via the data sealing mechanism. The
enclave first requests the CPU for a enclave-specific key
bound to its measurement. It then encrypts its private state
using the requested key before storing it on persistent stor-
age. The mechanism ensures that the sealed data can only
be accessed by the enclave that sealed it. Nevertheless, en-
clave recovery using sealed data is susceptible to rollback at-
tacks wherein an attacker (e.g., the malicious OS) provides
the enclave with properly sealed but stale data [20].
2.2 Consensus Protocols
A rich literature of consensus protocols has been devoted
to address a variety of fault tolerance problems in distributed
systems [23, 13]. Consensus algorithms can be broadly cat-
egorized by the failure model that they assume. On the
one hand, the crash failure model assumes that a faulty
process may stop processing any message, and it does not
resume [23]. On the other hand, the Byzantine failure
model may allow for arbitrary faults. A process experiencing
Byzantine failure may deviate from its expected behaviors in
any manner, it may equivocate (i.e., sending contradictory
messages to other processes), or it may intentionally delay
its activity for any period of time [13].
Consensus algorithms aim to achieve safety and liveness
in the presence of failures. Safety requires that non-faulty
processes reach an agreement and never return conflicting
results for the same request, whereas liveness means that
these processes eventually agree on a value. In the following,
we give an overview of Raft [23], a consensus protocol that
assumes crash failure model and ensures safety regardless of
timing. Nonetheless, its liveness depends on timing (e.g.,
the communication channels between processes are partially
synchronous, wherein messages are delivered within an un-
known but finite bound).
Raft Consensus Protocol. Raft assumes a system of n
deterministic processes (or servers), among which at most
f = n−1
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could be faulty. A faulty process fails by crashing.
Each process stores a log that contains a series of commands,
or events of interest. Raft ensures that logs of non-faulty
processes contain the same sequence of commands.
A process can be in one of the three roles, namely leader,
follower and candidate. Raft divides time into terms num-
bered with consecutive integers. In each term, one process
is elected as the leader, and all other processes are followers.
The leader exchanges periodic heartbeats with all follow-
ers to maintain its authority. If a follower does not receive
any heartbeat after an election timeout period, it assumes
that the leader has crashed. The follower then increases its
term, changes it role to candidate and begins an election.
The candidate becomes the leader if it receives votes from
a majority of processes. We refer readers to [23] for further
details on the leader election and its election criteria.
During normal operation, the followers are passive, only
responding to requests from the leader and candidate. The
leader receives all the commands (e.g., requests from the
clients), and replicates the commands on the followers. The
leader first appends a command as a new entry which is
uniquely identified by the leader’s term and an index to
its log. Next, it broadcasts the entry to all of the follow-
ers. The followers append the received entry to their logs,
and acknowledge the receipt to the leader. Once the leader
receives the acknowledgement from a majority of the pro-
cesses (i.e., f + 1 or more processes), it commits the entry
(i.e., execute the command contained in the entry), and all
preceding entries in its log. The leader records the high-
est index it knows to be committed, and includes this index
in subsequent messages to the followers, thereby informing
them on the committed entries.
Although Raft is designed for crash failure model, there
exists attempt that deploys Raft in a Byzantine setting [7].
This is achieved through the use of TEEs. More specifically,
by running the consensus protocol inside an enclave that
offers attested execution, one can restrict adversarial be-
haviours of the faulty processes, thereby reducing the threat
model from Byzantine fault tolerance to crash fault toler-
ance, to which Raft applies.
3. THE PROBLEM
In this section, we first define our system model in Sec-
tion 3.1. Next, we present the system goals that we seek to
achieve in Section 3.2. We then describe in Section 3.3 the
adversary model against which our proposed autonomous
membership service is designed. Finally, we detail the chal-
lenges of enabling autonomous membership service for en-
clave processes in Section 3.4.
3.1 System Model
We consider a typical outsourced computation model con-
sisting of a cloud service provider (CSP) and its users. The
CSP operates a set of machines (or hosts) that are equipped
with Intel SGX-enabled processors [21]. A user (i.e., appli-
cation owner) uploads her code to the cloud, and executes
her application on the cloud’s infrastructure. The applica-
tion involves secrets that the user wishes to keep private
from the CSP. This can be achieved by running the appli-
cation code (or a critical portion of its code) inside an SGX
enclave. In particular, the code uploaded to the cloud does
not contain any secret. The SGX architecture then relies on
the CSP’s hypervisor or OS to instantiate an enclave process
using the application code. Subsequently, the enclave pro-
cess attests itself to the application owner so as to convince
the latter that it is properly instantiated. Upon successful
attestation, the secret materials are securely provisioned to
the enclave.
The application code can be split into security-critical and
non-critical components. The critical component is to be run
in an enclave (or enclaves). The CSP may spawn multiple
instances of the same application. Each application instance
comprises both the critical and non-critical components, and
they are bound together. If the critical component is divided
into a set of enclaves, we assume that they are also uniquely
bound together. In another word, the service provider can-
not mix-and-match a component of one instance with that
of another instance without breaking the function of the ap-
plication. Consequently, it suffices to identify an application
instance by its enclave (or one of its enclaves). Without loss
of generality, we assume throughout the rest of the paper
that the application runs entirely in a single enclave, and
abuse the language to refer to each instance as a process.
Functional vs. Nonfunctional process. We assume that
the application involves secret materials that are concealed
from the CSP or any untrustworthy party, and that such se-
cret is necessary for the application’s operation (e.g., encryp-
tion/decryption keys). While the CSP has a sole discretion
in instantiating a new process using the application code,
such a process is initially nonoperational. Only until it is
provisioned with the aforementioned application secret does
it become operational. Put differently, although the CSP fa-
cilitates the commissioning of a new process, it cannot alone
complete such a commission.
Communication. The processes communicate only by
passing messages along a fixed set of channels facilitated by
CSP. Each pair of processes is connected via a reliable, au-
thenticated point-to-point communication channel that does
not drop any message. These channels, however, are subject
to a delivery scheduler controlled by the CSP. This allows
the CSP to impose arbitrary delay on any message at any
channel of its choice. When a channel is not intervened
by a malicious delivery scheduler, it is synchronous, in a
sense that all messages sent via that channel are delivered
within a finite delay ∆ known to all processes. The malicious
scheduler can postpone the delivery of any message for an
arbitrary duration, causing a communication fault, wherein
messages communicated via that channel are not delivered
within the delay ∆. Finally, we do not assume any global
clock, or bounds on relative local clock speed and execution
speed of each process.
Faults. We call a process faulty if it has crashed or halted.
A process is correct, otherwise. Under the communication
model described earlier, correct processes may be isolated
from other correct processes. Let us consider an application
Prog. We denote by ns(Prog) the number of Prog’s existing
processes at a given moment s. We deem a process p iso-
lated if p cannot communicate with a quorum of ⌊ns(Prog)
2
⌋
processes in a synchronous manner. We call a process active
if it is correct and not isolated.
Let fs(Prog) and is(Prog) be the number of faulty and iso-
lated processes among the ns(Prog) processes, respectively.
We deem the application Prog to be in anarchy at the given
moment s if:
fs(Prog) + is(Prog) > ⌊
ns(Prog)− 1
2
⌋ (1)
Hereafter, when it is clear from the context, we omit s and
Prog from the notations. Figure 1 depicts different faulty
scenarios Prog’s processes may experience, and state where
Prog is in anarchy.
3.2 System Goals
To allow for elasticity, the CSP needs to commission or
decommission processes dynamically overtime. Nonetheless,
this may expose the system to forking attacks, as described
earlier in Section 1. To address this problem, we seek an
autonomous membership service that protects the applica-
tion against such forking attacks. The membership service
polices the commissioning of new processes, and excommu-
nication of faulty or isolated processes from the system, sub-
ject to the SLA concerning the upkeeping of the application.
More specifically, while the CSP can instantiate a new pro-
cess at will, such a process remains nonoperational until its
request to join the existing group of processes is approved
by the membership service. In addition, the membership
service actively monitors the status of each member pro-
cess, and excommunicates a process that it suspects of being
faulty or isolated from the group.
To render the membership service autonomous, our ap-
proach is to augment each process of an application Prog
with a membership list that keeps track of Prog’s active
processes, and ensure that the membership lists of all active
processes converge without relying on manual intervention
of the application owner, or a trusted third party:
• If a process becomes faulty, it is required that the
faulty process is eventually suspected of having halted,
and excommunicated from the membership list of all
active processes. Communication from the excommu-
nicated process are discarded.
• A newly instantiated process must join the system
via the membership service before it is rendered func-
tional. The membership service ensures that this new
process is added to the membership list of all existing
active processes, and the former is brought up-to-date
with the current system membership list.
• Except for the instantiation of the first process, the
application owner does not involve in operation of the
membership service. All subsequent process attesta-
tion and secret provisioning are handled by active pro-
cesses in the system.
3.3 Adversary Model
We consider a powerful adversary that possesses all ca-
pabilities of the CSP. In practice, such adversary can be an
errant insider having complete access to the cloud infrastruc-
ture, or an attacker exploiting vulnerabilities in the cloud’s
software stack. The adversary is interested in conducting
a forking attack on the victim application, attempting to
launch an arbitrarily large number of enclave instances in
violation of the SLA, or to isolate the concurrently running
instances from each other. Nonetheless, we assume that the
adversary does not seek to undermine the application’s avail-
ability (e.g., by decommissioning all of its instances).
The adversary has complete control over the cloud’s OS
and/or hypervisor. It can schedule or corrupt all non-enclave
processes, and restart enclave instances at will. Moreover,
it can control all network communications between the en-
clave instances regardless of whether they are instantiated
on the same or across different hosts. More specifically, the
adversary can read, modify, reorder, delay or even drop the
messages sent by the enclaves arbitrarily.
Nonetheless, it cannot compromise protection mechanisms
of the SGX processors. That is, it can neither access the en-
clave runtime memory nor learn the application secrets that
are protected by the enclave execution, and does not have
any access to the processor’s private keys that are used for
attestation and data sealing functions. Finally, we assume
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
(a) n = 5, f = 2, i = 0. Prog is not in
anarchy.
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
> ∆
> ∆
(b) n = 5, f = 1, i = 1. Prog is not in
anarchy.
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
> ∆
> ∆
>
∆
(c) n = 5, f = 1, i = 2. Prog is in anar-
chy.
Figure 1: Illustrations of faulty, isolated and active processes. They are depicted in dotted, dashed and solid circles, respec-
tively.
that the adversary is computationally bounded, and cannot
break standard cryptographic assumptions.
We assume the application code running inside the en-
clave is secure. We do not consider side-channel attacks
against the enclave execution [26] and DoS attacks against
the system.
3.4 Challenges
The first challenge in enabling autonomous membership
service stems from the need of injecting application secret
to the newly instantiated process. Since the untrusted OS
is in charge of enclave instantiating, any secret material ne-
cessitated for the operations of the enclave process cannot
be contained in the enclave code, but should rather be pro-
visioned to the enclave only after it has been properly in-
stantiated. In a typical pipeline of enclave instantiating, this
secret provisioning is realised via the remote attestation pro-
cedure carried out by the application owner. Nonetheless, it
is unreasonable to assume the involvement of the application
owner in the instantiating of every enclave process, espe-
cially when processes may be commissioned dynamically to
meet the elasticity requirement of the application. Ideally,
the application owner only needs to involve in the instan-
tiating of the first enclave instance during the application
provisioning process, and does not have to take part in the
upkeeping of her application.
The second challenge lies in ensuring the security of
the membership service itself, especially against forking at-
tack [12] or logical partition. To further elaborate on this
challenge, we describe in the following two straw-man so-
lutions and point out their weaknesses. The first solution
assumes a trusted directory server keeping track of all run-
ning processes of the application, thereby offering the mem-
bership service. The second solution attempts to implement
the directory server as a replicated state machine so as to
avoid single-point-of-failure.
Directory server. A trusted directory server is in charge
of managing and attesting the correct instantiating of ap-
plication processes, and keeping track of all such running
processes. More specifically, the user uploads the expected
measurement of her application enclave process (i.e., the
hash of its initial state) along with its secret to the direc-
tory server via a secure channel. The directory server then
performs a remote attestation with the newly instantiated
enclave process on behalf of the user, and provides it with
the application secret upon successful attestation. It main-
tains a list of concurrently running processes, and refuses
the instantiating of the new process if it violates the SLA.
The directory server determines the aliveness of a process
in its process list by listening to a heartbeatmessage sent by
that process, to which it responds with an acknowledgement
ack. If it does not receive the heartbeat from the process
after a certain time-out period, it would assume that such
process has crashed, removing such process from its process
list. It is important to note that the excommunication of a
process may be due to communication fault, rather than the
said process having halted (i.e., unjust excommunication).
In order to keep the logic of the directory server simple,
we can enforce the unjust excommunication by forcing the
excommunicated process to halt. This can be achieved by
programming a process to commit suicide if it does not re-
ceive an ack from the directory server after a configurable
time-to-live period, and to restart its time-to-live timer
every time it receives an ack. Put differently, the ack from
the directory server acts as a lease that allows the receiving
process to continue operating for a fixed period of time until
it expires [16].
This approach, nevertheless, is not desired, for the direc-
tory server becomes a single-point-of-failure, or target for
attacks. For example, if the directory server is implemented
using TEE, it is subject to rollback attack [20] in which the
adversary may deceive it to resume operations using stale
process list, violating the integrity and consistency of the
directory server’s operations.
Replicated directory service. One approach to sidestep
the aforementioned single-point-of-failure issue is by repli-
cating the directory server. In particular, the directory ser-
vice now comprises of a set of replicas that leverage fault-
tolerant protocol to implement a replicated state machine,
ensuring consistency of the service’s operation despite indi-
vidual replica failures [25]. Nonetheless, it is challenging to
protect these replicas against forking attack [12], wherein the
adversary manage to splits the directory service replicas into
two “cliques”, each of which is unaware of the other. Such
attack allows the adversary to run twice as many number of
processes as what would otherwise be allowed by the SLA.
Addressing this issue, then, requires a membership service
offered to the directory service replicas themselves.
4. OUR DESIGN
In this section, we present our system
AMES (Autonomous MEmbership Service). We first
give an overview of AMES’s design. We later discuss in
details the main protocols that comprise the autonomous
membership service. We remark that although our discus-
sion assumes processes are provisioned as SGX enclaves,
the technique underlying AMES is applicable to other
Trusted Execution Environment platforms that support
similar features to SGX enclaves.
4.1 Overview
To enable the autonomous membership service for an ap-
plication Prog, AMES augments Prog’s processes to equip
them with the following parameters:
• peerList: a list that records all active processes of
Prog.
• term number: a value that represents the current term
(which we shall define in the following). The term
number increases monotonically.
• replicated log: a log that records messages the process
exchange during the operation of the membership ser-
vice. A log entry is indexed using the term number of
the term at which it is added, together with sequence
number that increases monotonically over time across
terms.
• commitIndex: the index of the latest entry in the repli-
cated log that is known to be committed. This value
increases monotonically over time.
• heartbeat timeout T: a randomized timeout used in
AMES’s heartbeat mechanism, unique for each pro-
cess.
• candidature timeout: the timeout used during the
leader election. This timeout is the same for all pro-
cesses.
While a process can always derive peerList from its repli-
cated log, and one may argue that they can be merged into
a single data structure, we find that treating them as two
separate entities keep our exposition clearer.
AMES requires the involvement of the application owner
during the application bootstrap so as to attest the correct
instantiating of the first process, and to provide it with the
application secret (Section 4.2). Once the first instance is
fully operational, the application owner may go offline un-
til the time when she wishes to shutdown the application.
All subsequent process instantiating (or dismantling) over
the lifetime of the application will be policed by AMES. To
this end, Prog needs to incorporate in its implementation
AMES’s protocols for managing the processes’ peerLists
and ensuring that they converge. We describe these proto-
cols in the remaining of this section, deferring discussion on
the implementation details to Section 5.
Workflow. Let n denote the number of processes of Prog at
a given time. AMES first elects one process to be the leader,
while the other [n − 1] processes are followers. A leader is
associated with a term, which is a time period of arbitrary
length in which the leader retains its authority. The leader
relies on a heartbeatmechanism to monitor the status of the
processes in the system, and to maintain its authority over
them (Section 4.3). In normal operation (i.e., the leader is
active), the followers need not exchange heartbeat messages
among themselves, but simply respond to messages from the
leader.
The commission of a new process requires an “approval”
from the membership service via a NewProcess protocol
orchestrated by the leader. More specifically, the leader at-
tests the new process, and checks against the SLA if its
commission is eligible (e.g., if the quota of concurrently run-
ning processes has not been consumed). The leader then
provisions the application secret to the new process, render-
ing it functional, and informs all followers to update their
peerLists accordingly (Section 4.4). If the leader suspects
a follower process ph of having halted (e.g., it did not re-
ceive a response from ph for the heartbeat message it has
sent to ph after a configurable heartbeat timeout Th which
is unique to ph), it drives the other followers to expel ph
from their peerList via the ExpelProcess protocol (Sec-
tion 4.5). Finally, when the user decides to shutdown the
application, she sends the shutdown request to the leader,
who then coordinates the termination of all active processes
via a ShutDown protocol, at the end of which they all cease
to operate (Section 4.6).
It is important to note that AMES admits unjust excom-
munication of a active process whose connection with the
leader is severed. To prevent the excommunicated process
from disrupting the membership service, its future commu-
nication (i.e., after the point of excommunication) will be
discarded, and the process will eventually halt.
The workflow described above has not accounted for
leader failure. If the leader halts or becomes isolated, fol-
lowers will eventually detect such failure, and engage in a
leader election protocol to elect a new leader. In particu-
lar, if a follower does not receive a heartbeat message from
the leader after its heartbeat timeout, it will assume that
the current leader is no longer viable, and attempt to claim
the leadership for itself (Section 4.3). When a new leader is
elected, the new term starts. During the period where a pro-
cess attempting to claim the leadership, it is referred to as a
candidate. More than one candidates may compete for the
leadership at the same time. The leader election guarantees
that only one candidate succeeds, and all active processes in
the system recognize the new leader as legitimate.
4.2 Application Bootstrap
In AMES, application bootstrap refers to the instantiat-
ing of the very first process of the application. This proce-
dure is initiated by the application owner, who instructs the
cloud service provider to instantiate an enclave process us-
ing the application code. Since the cloud’s OS/hypervisor is
not trusted, the instantiating has to be attested by the ap-
plication owner, and application secret is only provisioned
to the enclave after a successful attestation.
AMES benefits directly from Intel SGX’s remote attesta-
tion protocol [9] in implementing the above mentioned attes-
tation and secret provisioning. We highlight key character-
istics of the protocol, and refer the readers to [9] for further
details. The SGX architecture features a special enclave,
called Quoting Enclave, to facilitate the remote attestation.
After being instantiated, the attesting enclave invokes the
SGX’s EREPORT instruction and specifies the Quoting En-
clave as its target. The EREPORT creates a structure, called
report, that contains all necessary information to verify the
correctness of the attesting enclave’s instantiating, and pro-
duces a message authentication code (MAC) tag for the re-
port. The MAC is computed using a “report key” that is
associated only with the attesting enclave and its intended
target (i.e., Quoting Enclave in this case). The Quoting En-
clave verifies the report, and subsequently replaces its MAC
with a signature signed using a CPU’s private key under the
EPID group signature scheme [18], producing a remote at-
testation quote1. As Intel does not publish the group public
1EPID allows a signer to sign objects with his private key
key associated with the CPUs’ private key, the verifier has to
rely on the Intel Attestation Service to validate the remote
attestation quote.
It is worth noting that SGX remote attestation mecha-
nism allows the verifier to include a challenge in her at-
testation requests, and the attesting enclave to include a
manifest that contains response to the verifier’s challenge
and an ephemerally generated public key to the signed stru-
ture report, which is then carried over to the quote [9].
The challenge and response ensures freshness of the quote,
avoiding replay attack by the malicious OS. The ephemeral
public key allows the verifier to securely provision applica-
tion secrets to the enclave. Consequently, upon successful
application bootstrap, the first application process becomes
fully functional, containing the secrets necessitated for the
application’s operation.
4.3 HeartbeatExchange and Leader Election
During normal operation, the leader uses heartbeat
mechanism to maintain its leadership and to monitor status
of follower processes. A heartbeat is essentially a message
sent by the leader, and acknowledged with a corresponding
ack message by a follower, via an authenticated channel. A
heartbeat always contains the term number and commitIn-
dex of the leader (the latter is the index of the latest entry
in the leader’s replicated log that has been committed). The
follower relies on the leader’s commitIndex to detect if its
replicated log and state are up-to-date with those of the
leader. If a follower finds that its log misses some entries, or
its state is out of date, it fetches the missing log entries and
commit them, bringing its state up-to-date. The heartbeat
can also contain information regarding the commission (ex-
communication) of a new (existing) follower process, which
we shall elaborate in the following subsections.
When a new process becomes functional, it initially as-
sumes the role of a follower. The follower process pi and the
leader process pL establish a randomized timeout Ti, which
is unique to each follower process, chosen from a fixed inter-
val. Via the heartbeat mechanism, pL can identify if it has
become isolated, and halts if it is so. On the other hand,
if pL is active but cannot receive an ack message from pi
over a period of Ti, it suspects the latter of having halted,
and triggers the ExpelProcess protocol to inform all other
followers of pi failure. Alternatively, if the follower pi is ac-
tive but cannot receive a heartbeat from the leader over a
period of Ti, it changes its role to candidate, increases its
term number and broadcasts a RequestVote message to all
existing processes in its peerList to claim the leadership.
The RequestVote message from pi takes a form of
〈pi, newTerm, lastLogIndex〉, where newTerm is its current
term number (which has just been increased), and last-
LogIndex is the index of the last entry in its replicated log.
Upon receiving RequestVote from pi, a receiver process pr
acts as follows:
• If pi is not in pr’s peerList, it ignores pi’s
RequestVote.
• If pi appears in its peerList, but pr has recently re-
ceived a message from the leader pL (i.e., its timeout Tr
without uniquely identifying the signer or linking his differ-
ent signatures. This is achieved by assigning each signer to
a “group” such that the group’s public key can be used to
verify all signatures produced by the group member.
has not expired), pr queues pi’s RequestVote if it has
not queued any other RequestVote. If pr has queued
a RequestVote from another candidate pc’, pr deter-
mines the dominating candidate among pi and pc’
2,
keeping only the RequestVote of the dominating can-
didate, and informing the dominated candidate on the
existence of the dominating one. Once its heartbeat
timeout Tr expires, pr check if it is dominated by the
candidate whose RequestVote is currently kept in its
queue. If so, it grants its vote to the candidate; oth-
erwise it discards such a RequestVote and broadcasts
its own. On the other hand, if pr receives the next
hearbeat from pL before Tr expires, it resets Tr and
discards any RequestVote in its queue.
• If pi is in its peerList, but it has voted for another
candidate (potentially itself) that is not dominated by
pi, pr informs pi on such candidate.
If pi collects a quorum of votes from a majority of the pro-
cesses in its peerList for its RequestVote before its heart-
beat timeout expires, it assumes the role of the leader. It
then drives the processes to expel pL from their peerList.
While waiting for the votes, if pi is informed of another can-
didate that outweighs itself, pi resets its heartbeat timeout
and waits for the other candidate to pronounce its leader-
ship. When pi is informed of a new leader whose term is
as large as its current term via a heartbeat from the latter,
it acknowledges the leader’s heartbeat, and returns its role
to follower. If pi fails to collect a quorum of responses from
a majority of the processes, or a heartbeat from the new
leader within its heartbeat timeout, it increases its term and
triggers a new election with a new RequestVote. Finally, if
pi is still assuming the candidate role (i.e., it can neither
claim the leadership nor return to the follower role) when
its candidature timeout expires, it commits suicide.
Security Arguments: The leader election in AMES follows
Raft’s leader election [23] to certain extent. The key differ-
ence here is that a candidate pi shall halt (by committing
suicide) if it cannot collect a quorum of responses or a heart-
beat from the new leader within the candidature timeout.
Here, we reason about the correctness of this design when
the system is not in anarchy.
The fact that pi issuing its RequestVote implies either the
leader pL has become faulty or isolated, or the connection
between pi and the active pL has been severed.
If pL is isolated, it will detect its isolation by itself and
halts, thereby becoming faulty. When pL is indeed faulty
3,
other processes will either grant pi their vote or inform it
on the dominating candidate. If pi is active (i.e., it is not
isolated), it will have received enough responses to either
claim the leadership, and thereby orchestrating the removal
of pL, or to wait to be contacted by the new leader. On
the other hand, if pL is active, it would have simultaneously
driven other processes to expel pi from their peerList, pre-
venting them from responding to pi’s RequestVote. This,
in turn, prevents pi from being able to collect a quorum of
2We say a candidate pc dominates (or outweights) another
candidate pc’ if it has a more up-to-date log, which is deter-
mined by the index of last entries in the logs [23].
3In this case, no new process can be commissioned, and no
process failures can be detected during the period when the
system is in the leader election stage.
responses for its RequestVote, which subsequently leads to
pi’s committing suicide.
Remark. While our design admits a potential unjust excom-
munication of an active process whose connection to the
active leader is severed, this is necessary to sidestep the dif-
ficulty of solving membership problem in an asynchronous
environment when faults may be present [15, 24]. By re-
quiring the active yet excommunicated process to commit
suicide, AMES preserves the consistency of the leader’s ex-
pelling decision and safety of the membership service.
4.4 NewProcess Protocol
After the application has been bootstrapped and as long
as it is not in anarchy, AMES enables the application
to commission new processes in an autonomous manner,
without relying on manual intervention of the application
owner, or a trusted third party. This section describes how
AMES commissions a new process pj and ensures that the
peerLists of all active processes are updated accordingly
and that they converge. Let n be the number of existing
processes at the beginning of pj’s commission, and assume
that the SLA allows n > 2.
Case n = 1. The only running and functional process at
the beginning of pj’s commission is the leader pL. The inter-
action between the two processes happen in two phases. In
the first phase, pj contacts pL for attestation. The results of
this attestation are two-fold. First, pL is convinced that pj is
correctly instantiated. Second, the two processes establish
a secure and authenticated communication channel. In the
second phase, pL updates its peerList to include pj, provi-
sions the application secret as well as its current peerList to
pj via the secure channel and establishes a heartbeat time-
out Tj. Likewise, pj’s peerList now contains itself and pL.
At this point, pj becomes fully functional, and assumes a
role of a follower.
Security Arguments: The interaction between pL and pj
described earlier follows the workflow of a 2-phase-commit
(2PC) protocol [11], with pL assuming the role of the coor-
dinator. The attestation in the first phase acts as a prepare
phase in the 2PC protocol, whereas the provisioning of the
application secret to pj and updating of peerLists mirror
the commit phase of the 2PC protocol. Provided that the
application is not in anarchy (i.e., pL remains active), our
NewProcess protocol does not suffer from blocking, and
the peerLists of pL and pj converge.
Case n = 2. Let us call the two existing processes pL and
p2, with pL being the leader. The commissioning of pj hap-
pens in two phase. In the first phase, pL engages in a re-
mote attestation with pj, and at the same time queries p2
(this query is piggybacked on a heartbeat sent to p2) if it
is ready to update its peerList to contain pj. In the second
phase, if the attestation checks out, and p2 responds with
a “yes” vote (the vote is piggybacked on the ack message
corresponding to the heartbeat carrying the query), pL up-
dates its peerList to include pj, transfers the application
secret as well as the current peerList to pj, and establishes
a heartbeat timeout Tj with pj. pL also informs p2 to update
its peerList accordingly. pj now becomes fully functional,
and assume a role of a follower.
Security Arguments: Similar to the case where n = 1, the
interaction between pL, p2, and pj described above follows
the workflow of a 2PC protocol [11], with pL assuming the
role of the coordinator. Provided that the application is
not in anarchy (i.e., both existing processes are active), our
NewProcess protocol does not suffer from blocking, and
the peerLists of all processes converge at the end of pj’s
commission.
Case n > 2. The leader pL first checks if the commission
of pj is eligible according to the SLA. If so, it engages in
a remote attestation with pj. Next, pL follows Raft [23] to
informing all other followers about the commission of pj:
1. pL puts an entry 〈add, pj〉 to its log.
2. pL broadcasts 〈add, pj〉 to all the followers.
3. Upon receiving 〈add, pj〉, a follower pi acknowledges
the receipt by sending 〈acki, add, pj〉 to pL, and puts
〈add, pj〉 to its log.
4. Once pL confirms that 〈add, pj〉 has been replicated on
a majority of the processes, its adds pj to its peerList,
establishes a heartbeat timeout Tj with pj, and trans-
fers to pj the application secret and its peerList. In
another word, pL “commits” the entry 〈add, pj〉.
5. pL announces the commit of 〈add, pj〉 in the next mes-
sage it exchanges with the followers. Once the follow-
ers see the commit, they add pj to their peerList.
Security Arguments: Provided that the application is not in
anarchy, the peerLists of all active processes converge. This
follows directly from the security guarantees of Raft [23],
which ensures protocol safety as long as any majority of
the processes are active (i.e., they are operational and can
communicate with each other without communication fault).
4.5 ExpelProcess Protocol
When the leader pL suspects that a process ph has become
faulty (e.g., it does not receive a response for the heartbeat
sent to ph after the timeout Th bound to ph), it drives all
other followers to expel ph from their peerList.
1. pL puts an entry 〈Expel, ph〉 to its log.
2. pL broadcasts 〈Expel, ph〉 to all the followers.
3. A follower pi acknowledges the receipt by sending
〈acki, Expel, ph〉 to pL, and puts 〈Expel, ph〉 to its log.
4. Once pL confirms that 〈Expel, ph〉 has been replicated
on a majority of the processes (excluding ph), its expels
ph from its peerList. In another word, pL commits the
entry 〈Expel, ph〉.
5. pL announces the commit of 〈Expel, ph〉 in the next
message it exchanges with the followers. Once the
followers see the commit, they expel ph from their
peerList.
Security Arguments: Since the ExpelProcess protocol is
essentially an instance of Raft [23], it follows from the secu-
rity guarantees of Raft that the peerLists of all processes
at the end of the ExpelProcess
as the application is not in anarchy. It is worth noting that
AMES admits unjust excommunication of a correct but po-
tentially isolated process or an active process whose connec-
tion to the leader pL is severed. To prevent the excommu-
nicated process from disrupting the membership service, all
its future communication will be discarded. This is enforced
by having other processes not responding to message from
a process that is not in their peerList. This would also
lead the unjustly excommunicated process to halting. In
particular, the unjustly excommunicated process will trig-
ger a leader election, for it has not received any heart-
beat from the leader pL. Nonetheless, it cannot obtain the
required quorum of responses from other processes for its
RequestVote, thereby committing suicide as mentioned in
Section 4.3.
4.6 ShutDown Protocol
When the application owner wishes to shutdown all pro-
cesses of the application, she sends the shutdown request to
the leader pL, who then coordinates the termination of all
active processes as follows:
1. pL puts an entry 〈preShutdown〉 to its log. It seals
the application data, if any, to persistent storage using
SGX’s data sealing mechanism.
2. pL broadcasts 〈preShutdown〉 to all the followers.
3. A follower pi puts the received 〈preShutdown〉 to its
log. Next, it seals the application data, if any, to per-
sistent storage, and responds to the leader by sending
〈acki, preShutdown〉.
4. Once pL confirms that 〈preShutdown〉 has been repli-
cated on a majority of the processes, it broadcasts
〈commitShutdown〉 to all the followers, thereby an-
nouncing the committing of the shutdown request. Fi-
nally, its informs the application owner that shutdown
request has been served, and halts.
5. Once the followers see the 〈commitShutdown〉, they
halt.
Security Arguments: Similar to the ExpelProcess proto-
col, the ShutDown protocol is an instance of Raft [23]. It
follows from the security guarantees of Raft that so long as
the application is not in anarchy, all active processes shall
respond to the shutdown request, and halt. Even if the
application is in anarchy, as long as the leader commits sui-
cide, all other processes will eventually halt (as we discuss
in the next subsection), thereby also bringing the shutdown
request into effect.
4.7 Anarchy
The application is in anarchy if the total number of faulty
and isolated processes (denoted by f and i respectively) ex-
ceeds ⌊n−1
2
⌋. When the application falls into anarchy, the
status of the current leader pL becomes critical. If pL re-
mains active, the application may still be operational. On
the other hand, if it is either faulty or isolated, all existing
processes will eventually halt, thereby shutdown the entire
application. We remark that this only affects availability
of the application, not the security of the membership ser-
vice. More specifically, even if the application is in anarchy,
the peerList of active processes do not diverge. In the fol-
lowing, we examine the situations where the application is
in anarchy and how the status of the leader pL affects the
operation of the application.
Case (f > ⌊n−1
2
⌋): If the leader pL is among the f faulty
processes, the remaining correct processes will trigger leader
election. Nonetheless, since f > ⌊n−1
2
⌋, none of them will
be able to obtain a sufficient quorum of responses for their
RequestVote. Consequently, all correct process shall even-
tually halt by committing suicide, which effectively shuts
the application down in its entirety.
If pL is active, it will attempt to trigger the ExpelPro-
cess to excommunicate faulty processes. Nonetheless, it
cannot collect sufficient acknowledgement after step (3) of
the ExpelProcess protocol, and hence shall identify it-
self as being isolated, thereby haling by committing suicide.
This further increases f , and pL now has become faulty. Sub-
sequently, the remaining correct processes will trigger the
leader election, and eventually halt for not being able to col-
lect a sufficient quorum of responses to their RequestVote,
shutting down the application.
Case (i > ⌊n−1
2
⌋): If pL identifies itself as being isolated
(i.e., pL is among the i isolated processes), it will halt and
thereby becomes faulty. Once pL is faulty, the remaining
isolated processes will trigger the leader election, and will
eventually halt for not being able to collect a sufficient quo-
rum of responses to their RequestVote. In another words,
the i isolated processes will eventually become faulty, ren-
dering f > ⌊n−1
2
⌋ and causing the application to shut down,
as discussed earlier.
If pL is active, and can successfully drives the followers
to complete all NewProcess and ExpelProcess protocols
that it triggers, the application remains operational. We
note that whenever there is a new process added to the sys-
tem membership list, or an existing process is excluded, the
value of n changes, which may moves the application out of
or into anarchy.
Case (f < ⌊n−1
2
⌋ ∧ i < ⌊n−1
2
⌋ ∧ (f + i) > ⌊n−1
2
⌋): If pL is
isolated, it will halt and thereby become faulty. Once pL
is faulty, the remaining isolated processes will trigger the
leader election. Nonetheless, being isolated, they cannot col-
lect a sufficient quorum of responses to their RequestVote.
Consequently, they will halt, and thus become faulty. At this
point, the total number of faulty processes exceeds ⌊n−1
2
⌋,
causing the application to shut down.
If pL is active, and can successfully drives the correct fol-
lowers to exclude the faulty processes from their peerLists
via the ExpelProcess protocol, the application contin-
ues to be operational. Similar to the previous case where
i > ⌊n−1
2
⌋, each process commission or excommunication
changes the value of n, which may move the application out
of or into anarchy.
4.8 Timeout Configurations
It should be clear from our security arguments thus far
that safety of AMES does not depend on timing. In an-
other words, peerLists of all active process converge even
if they do not share any global clock, and their execution
speed may differ. Nonetheless, its liveness (i.e., the service
being able to make progress) is inevitably dependent upon
timing, especially HeartbeatExchange and Leader Elec-
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Figure 2: A process in AMES comprises a control thread
that is responsible for partaking in the autonomous mem-
bership service, and a worker thread that is responsible for
handling the application’s operational logic.
tion protocols. A necessary condition for liveness in AMES
is:
broadcastTime ≪ heartbeat timeout ≤ candidature timeout ≪
EIATime
where broadcastTime is the the average time required for
a process to send messages (in parallel) to other processes
and receive their responses; heartbeat timeout and candida-
ture timeout are the timeouts described in Section 4.1; and
EIATime are events’ inter-arrival time, with events being a
new process instantiating, or failure/dismantling of existing
processes in the membership cluster. Ideally, the timeouts
should be an order of magnitude larger than the broad-
castTime, and EIATime should be a few orders of magnitude
larger than the timeouts. It is also reasonable to configure
the heartbeat timeout to be less than or equal to the candi-
dature timeout. This setting allows the candidate to retry
a leader election with a new RequestVote at a higher term,
in case there is a split vote and the current term ends with
no leader being elected.
While broadcastTime and EIATime depends on the under-
lying communication system and dynamic workloads of the
application, respectively, the timeouts can be tuned at our
discretion. As we show in our empirical evaluation, broad-
castTime ranges from 10ms to 60ms for processes located
across different geographical regions. We expect typical EIA-
Time in typical applications to be in the neighborhood of tens
of seconds. Consequently, the timeouts could be set in the
range of 250 − 500ms. Section 6 elaborates on the effect of
timeout configuration on the performance of AMES.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
To facilitate the incorporation of AMES’s logic in the
implementation of an enclave application Prog, we provide
application developers with a AMES library. The library
envelops the membership service’s operations in a control
thread, separating them from the original operational logic
of Prog that is to be implemented in a worker thread (or
threads). As a result, each Prog’s enclave process comprises
one control thread, and one or more worker threads (as de-
picted in Figure 2). OurAMES library implementation con-
tains approximately 3, 000 lines of C++ code, and builds on
the Raft implementation by RethinkDB [5].
Control thread vs worker thread. The control thread
is responsible for exchanging heartbeat messages, conduct-
ing remote attestation and secure channel establishment in
the NewProcess protocol, and handling messages that are
exchanged in other protocols of AMES. It is worth noting
that the message exchange of the control thread entails con-
text switching of the enclave. To reduce context switching
overhead, our implementation piggybacks control thread’s
messages on the worker thread’s interface with the untrusted
application (e.g., its ECall and OCall) whenever necessary.
Recall that both the control thread and the worker thread
belong to the same enclave, the control thread can seal the
application data handled by the worker thread to persistent
storage, if need be, in the ShutDown protocol. In addition,
the control thread handles the process’s suicide by destroy-
ing its own enclave.
Reducing IAS access overhead. In the NewProcess
protocol, the newly instantiated process has to attest itself
to the leader, so as to convince the latter of its correct in-
stantiation. If the new process is not located in the same
physical host with the leader, they have to engage in a re-
mote attestation procedure. In such a situation, the leader
(i.e., remote verifier) cannot verify the attestation of an at-
testing process locally, but has to rely on the Intel’s Attes-
tation Service (IAS) to verify the signature contained in the
attestation [4]. Contacting the IAS in every run of New-
Process protocol would incur a significant overhead that is
unfavorable for the application performance.
We make an observation that the multitenancy nature of
cloud computing allows for a remedy of the aforementioned
IAS access overhead. In particular, it is often the case that
the CSP provisions many processes (either of the same or
different applications) on the same physical host. There-
fore, we can reduce the IAS access overhead by introducing
a HostAttestationDelegate (HAD) enclave at each physical
host, and routing the remote attestation between two pro-
cesses instantiated on two separate physical hosts via their
prospective HAD enclaves.
Let us consider two physical hosts h1 and h2, and denote
their HAD enclaves by HAD_E1 and HAD_E2, respectively, as
depicted in Figure 3. These two HAD enclaves engage in a
conventional remote attestation, and rely on IAS to verify
the attestation. Once HAD_E1 and HAD_E2 have completed
the attestation and established a secure channel, any pair
of processes pA1 and p
A
2 of an application A provisioned on h1
and h2, respectively, can remotely attest one another with-
out having to invoke the IAS. In particular, to attest its
correct instantiating to pA2, p
A
1 first leverages the local attes-
tation procedure to prove its correctness to HAD_E1 which
then conveys this attestation result to HAD_E2 via the secure
channel. Finally, HAD_E2 locally attests to p
A
2 that it is cor-
rectly instantiated, gaining the latter’s trust, and then con-
veys pA1’s attestation result to p
A
2. This approach essentially
amortizes the IAS access overhead incurred by the attesta-
tion of HAD enclaves, and allows two processes pA1 and p
A
2 of
an application A provisioned on two separate hosts h1 and h2
to conduct remote attestation without contacting the IAS.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we report our experimental study of
AMES. Our experiments are conducted in two different set-
tings. The first setting is based on an in-house (local) cluster
consisting of 35 servers, each equipped with Intel Xeon E3-
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Figure 3: AMES introduces HostAttestationDelegate en-
clave at each host, and leverages them to reduce IAS access
overhead incurred in the NewProcess protocol.
Table 1: Latency (ms) between different regions on GCP.
Zone us-west1 us-west2 us-east1 us-east4
us-west1 0.0 24.7 66.7 59.0
us-west2 24.7 0.0 62.9 60.5
us-east1 66.7 62.9 0.0 12.7
us-east4 59.1 60.4 12.7 0.0
1240 2.1GHz CPUs, 32GB RAM and 2TB hard drive. The
latency between any two servers are roughly 0.13ms. In this
setting, we run each process on a separate server. The sec-
ond setting is based on Google Cloud Platform (GCP), in
which we use a separate instance provisioned with 2 vCPUs
and 8GB RAM for each process. The instances on GCP
span across 4 regions, namely Oregon (us-west1), Los Ange-
les (us-west2), South Carolina (us-east1) and North Virginia
(us-east4). The average latency between these regions ob-
served in our experiment is detailed in Table 1.
The trusted code base in our experiment is implemented
using Intel SGX SDK [2]. For the experiments that we run
on GCP, we configured the SDK to run in simulation mode,
as SGX is not available on GCP instances. We measured
the latency of each SGX operation on our local cluster’s
CPU with SGX Enabled BIOS support, and injected it to
the simulation. We observe that public key operations are
expensive: signing and signature verification take roughly
450µs and 844µs, respectively. Context switching and sym-
metric key operations take less than 5µs. Remote attesta-
tion, which involves access to the IAS, takes about 250ms
on average. Unless otherwise stated, the results reported in
the following are averaged over 20 independent runs.
6.1 AMES Overhead
We evaluate overhead incurred by AMES over vanilla
SGX execution using five benchmarks (i.e., mcf, deepsjeng,
leela, exchang2, and xz) selected from SPEC CPU2017 [6]
on our local cluster. We leverage Intel SGX SDK [2] to port
the benchmarks into enclave execution, enveloping their op-
erational logic in a worker thread. We then inject a control
thread that is responsible to implement the membership ser-
vice to the enclave using our AMES library.
Figure 4 reports the running time of each AMES-enabled
benchmarks under different range of heartbeat timeouts nor-
malized against their own vanilla SGX execution’s running
time. For a given range [a, b], a heartbeat timeout is cho-
sen uniformly at random between a and b, inclusively. The
overhead ranges from 5% to 16%, with smaller timeout
range leads to higher overhead. This is so because smaller
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Figure 4: AMES’s overhead compared to vanilla SGX exe-
cution. The running time of each benchmark is normalized
against its own vanilla SGX execution’s.
heartbeat timeouts result in higher frequency of the leader
contacting the follower processes to maintain its authority,
which in turns leads to higher communication overhead and
control switching. We also observe that the overhead is more
evident when benchmark workload is computation inten-
sive and requires few control switching for I/O (e.g., for the
heartbeat timeout range of [50−100](ms), mcf witnesses an
overhead of 8%, whereas exchange sports a 15% overhead.
This makes sense because our implementation piggybacks
AMES control thread’s messages on the worker thread’s in-
terface with the untrusted application (e.g., its ECall and
OCall) whenever necessary. Thus, the more interactions the
worker thread has with the untrusted application over the
course of the execution, the fewer control switching the pro-
cess has to trigger exclusively for exchanging the control
thread’s messages, and hence lower the overhead. Compar-
ing across figure 4a and figure 4b, we can see that while the
overhead increases when there are more processes in the sys-
tem, the difference is insignificant. In particular, when n in-
creases from 5 to 9, the difference in the normalized running
time is less than 1% for all benchmarks in our experiment.
6.2 Leader Election
In the second set of experiments, we study the effect of
timeout configurations on AMES leader election. We mea-
sure the leader election latency as a period from when we
crash the leader of a cluster of n servers (with n ranges from
5 to 33) to the moment when the new leader announces its
authority. We experiment with different range of heartbeat
timeouts and candidature timeout. For a given range [a, b],
a heartbeat timeout is chosen uniformly at random between
a and b, inclusively, while the candidature timeout is set to
5× b.
Figure 5 reports the latency under difference timeout set-
tings on our local cluster and GCP. On our local cluster,
the smaller the timeout range, the lower the leader elec-
tion latency is. However, this phenomenon is not observed
in our experiments on the GCP. More specifically, with the
timeout range of [50− 100](ms), the leader election latency
on GCP ranges from 405− 552ms, while the timeout range
of [200 − 300](ms) yields the lower leader election latency
ranging from 325 − 458ms.
A careful analysis of the difference between our local clus-
ter and GCP confirms the necessity of proper timeout con-
figurations (see Section 4.8) with respect to communication
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Figure 5: Leader election latency.
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Figure 6: NewProcess’s latency.
latency (or broadcastTime). Recall that on our local clus-
ter, the latency between any two servers is roughly 0.13ms,
whereas that of GCP ranges from 24ms to 66ms, depends
on the geolocation of the servers. When the heartbeat and
candidature timeout is too small compared to the commu-
nication latency, the candidates face difficulty in collecting
sufficient responses to its RequestVote in time, entering the
new terms and triggering new leader election prematurely.
This leads to unnecessary leader elections, and exacerbates
the system availability.
6.3 NewProcess Protocol
We now examine the cost of the NewProcess protocol
with and without HostAttestationDelegate (HAD) enclave.
Recall that by incorporating HAD enclave, the leader and
the new process can engage in a remote attestation without
contacting the IAS.
Figure 6 depicts the latency of NewProcess protocol
with respect to different number of existing processes in the
system at the beginning of the new process’s commission.
The latency of NewProcess protocol is measured as the
duration between the new process pj signaling its join re-
quest till pj receiving the application secret and becoming
fully functional.
On our local cluster (Figure 6a), NewProcess without
HAD enclaves takes from 270 − 325ms, whereas incorporat-
ing HAD enclaves reduces such a cost to 18 − 65ms. This
difference is primarily due to the cost of IAS access, which
is approximately 250ms in our experiments. A similar re-
sult is observed on GCP experiments (Figure 6b), wherein
incorporating HAD enclaves significantly reduces the cost of
the NewProcess protocol. Compared to the experiments
on our local cluster, the NewProcess latency observed on
GCP is higher (e.g., 145 − 285ms compared to 18 − 65ms
with HAD enclaves). This is so because the cost of the un-
derlying consensus protocol itself, especially the broadcast
time during the consensus run, differ significantly between
5 9 17 33
0
200
400
600
n
L
at
en
cy
(m
s)
Local Cluster GCP
Figure 7: ExpelProcess’s latency.
the two settings.
6.4 ExpelProcess Protocol
Finally, we examine the cost of the ExpelProcess proto-
col by crashing a process ph, and measure the latency from
such the crash till the time when ph is expelled from the
leader’s peerList. On our local cluster, the heartbeat time-
out is chosen randomly in the range of [25− 50]ms, whereas
the corresponding range on GCP is [200− 300]ms. Figure 7
plots the latency of the ExpelProcess protocol observed
on our local cluster and GCP, with respect to different n.
Similar to NewProcess protocol, the latency observed on
GCP is significantly higher than that observed in our local
cluster. We attribute this to the difference in the timeout
configurations, which in turn is influenced by the broadcast
time of each setting.
7. RELATED WORK
Membership service. Birman et al. [24] formulated the
problem of group membership in asynchronous environ-
ments. The authors acknowledge that the system’s live-
ness entails the possibility of erroneous failure detection, and
the need of suppressing communication from a process that
is unjustly excommunicated. Our autonomous membership
service follows this observation, fulfilling the excommunica-
tion by having an unjustly excommunicated process commit-
ting suicide. Amir et al. [8] proposed a membership protocol
that relies on atomic broadcast, whereas Mishra et al. [22]
leveraged a multicast facility that preserves the partial order
of messages exchanged among the communicating processes
to construct a membership protocol. Our approach, on the
other hand, does not make any assumption on the underly-
ing broadcast/multicast primitives. Instead, it builds on a
well-known consensus protocol, namely Raft [23], to imple-
ment the membership service.
Live migration and replications of SGX enclaves. Gu
et al. [17] present technique for live enclave migration on
the cloud. In contrary to our membership service, their sys-
tem model allows only one instance of the application to be
functional at any time. ReplicaTEE [25] attempts to enable
seamless replication of SGX enclaves by relying on a dis-
tributed directory service layer that handles provisioning of
enclave processes, and keeps track of the number of existing
processes. Nevertheless, it is unclear how the directory ser-
vice’s replicas are protected against forking attack, wherein
the adversary splits the directory service replicas into two
cliques, each of which is fully operational but unaware of the
other. This attack effectively allows the adversary to repli-
cate more enclave processes than what would otherwise be
allowed by the SLA.
8. CONCLUSION
We have described an autonomous membership service for
enclave-based applications. While the application bootstrap
necessitates the involvement of the application owner, all
subsequent process commission and decommission are ad-
ministered the existing and active processes of the applica-
tion. The proposed membership service necessarily admits
unjust excommunication of a non-faulty process from the
membership group, which is then fulfilled by the unjustly
excommunicated process committing suicide. The experi-
mental study shows that AMES incurs 5%− 16% overhead
compared to vanilla enclave execution.
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